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INTRODUCTION 
 The legal debate over state sovereign immunity has persisted 
practically since the founding.1  Under the sovereign immunity doctrine, 
                                                                                                                                     
 †  J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law, B.A. Washington and Lee 
University.  Once again, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor John Paul Jones 
for all of his guidance in writing this article.  I also thank Thomas and Annette Gates and 
Elizabeth Martin for their love and support. 
 1 See generally Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also Alfred 
Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (2001) 
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states cannot be sued without their consent even for violations of the 
Constitution or federal law.2  Sovereign immunity, thus, kindles the 
lasting tension between the supposed supremacy of federal law and the 
separate sovereignty of the states.3  Since its initial recognition of state 
sovereign immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court has 
recognized several exceptions to the doctrine designed to secure state 
compliance with federal law.4  One such exception is the Ex Parte Young 
doctrine. In Ex Parte Young, the Court announced that individual state 
citizens could bring suit against state officers in federal court for an 
ongoing violation of federal law.5  As discussed further below, the Court 
based this exception on the legal fiction that a suit against a state officer 
in violation of federal law is not a suit against the state at all, but rather, a 
suit against a rogue state officer stripped of his authority.6  The Ex Parte 
Young exception has survived subject only to some refinement. In recent 
decades, however, the Supreme Court has vastly expanded the bar of 
sovereign immunity as an integral part of the “federalist revival” begun 
by the Rehnquist Court.7  As explored in further detail below, the Court 
recently has incorporated the “anti-commandeering” principles from 
parallel federalism cases into its sovereign immunity jurisprudence, 
resulting in a significant narrowing of federal judicial power to hear 
claims against the states.  Against this backdrop, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a novel issue of sovereign 
immunity with major implications for administrative law. 
 In Virginia v. Reinhard, the Fourth Circuit confronted a question 
of first impression about the applicability of the Ex Parte Young 
exception.  That case presented the issue of whether a state 
administrative agency could bring suit in federal court against another 
                                                                                                                                     
(describing the overwhelming hostility toward sovereign immunity in the academic 
community). 
 2 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890). After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alden v. Maine, the doctrine of sovereign immunity encompasses states’ immunity from 
suit in its own courts without the consent of its legislature as well as the more 
traditionally recognized immunity from suit in federal court and the courts of other states. 
Because Virginia v. Reinhard involved a state’s immunity from suit in federal court, 
sovereign immunity, as the term is used in this paper, refers to a state’s immunity from 
suit in federal court without its consent. 
 3 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of 
the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L. J. 1167, 1178–79 (2003). 
 4 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 5 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) 
 6 See id. at 160. 
 7 See generally Ernest Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 
41 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1601 (2000). 
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state agency to secure its compliance with federal law.8  In holding that 
the agency could not bring suit under Ex Parte Young, the Court of 
Appeals issued a decision with major implications for administrative law 
and how state agencies may enforce state compliance with federal 
regulatory schemes.  This article examines and explicates the basis of the 
court’s decision in Reinhard and considers the decision’s consequences.  
The Court of Appeals’ rationale goes to the most fundamental principles 
and structure of the system of dual federalism.  Part II begins by 
examining the Reinhard decision. Examination of both the district 
court’s decision and the Fourth Circuit’s decision proves helpful in fully 
understanding the rationale.  As shown, the Fourth Circuit drew 
primarily from recent Supreme Court authority incorporating principles 
of political accountability and protection of special sovereignty interests 
into the sovereign immunity doctrine.  For this reason, an examination of 
the Supreme Court’s major sovereign immunity decisions is crucial to 
understanding Reinhard.  Part III develops the Supreme Court’s 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It begins by recounting the origins of 
sovereign immunity and proceeds to trace the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent incorporation of anti-commandeering theory and additional 
limits to shield unique, core state functions into the sovereign immunity 
doctrine.  Part IV evaluates the Court of Appeals’ application of these 
concepts in Reinhard and offers insight into the practical consequences 
of the decision.  This article ultimately concludes that Reinhard merely 
constitutes a natural extension of the sound theoretical principles 
announced in the Supreme Court’s most recent sovereign immunity 
cases.  Moreover, the practical consequences for state agency 
enforcement of federal regulatory schemes will be minimal because of 
the remaining avenues available for enforcing federal rights. 
                                                                                                                                     
 8 Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court of Appeals 
noted that other courts had proceeded to the merits in cases despite the presence of state 
agencies as opposing parties. Id. at 118 n.1. It distinguished those cases, however, 
because they involved suits brought by private protection and advocacy systems set up by 
states and not actual public state agencies. Id. More precisely, therefore, Reinhard is the 
first instance in which a court confronted public state administrative agencies on 
opposing sides of litigation. 
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THE REINHARD DECISION 
A. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia’s 
Decision 
 In Virginia v. Reinhard, a Virginia administrative agency 
brought suit against the officers of three other Virginia administrative 
agencies.  The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (“VOPA”) 
filed a complaint against the officers of the Department of Mental 
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services 
(“DMHMRSAS”), the Central Virginia Training Center (“CVTC”), and 
the Central State Hospital (“CSH”) in their official capacities.9 VOPA is 
an agency charged with protecting and advocating the rights and interests 
of disabled persons within the Commonwealth.10  Although a state 
agency, it constitutes a protection and advocacy system created under the 
authority of federal enabling statutes to safeguard federal rights.11  
Congress incentivizes state legislatures to create such administrative 
agencies by providing funding for protection and advocacy systems that 
meet the requirements of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (“DDA”) and the Protection and Advocacy for 
Individuals with Mental Illness Act (“PAIMI”).12 
 These federal statutes grant state advocacy systems such as 
VOPA authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of disabled 
persons in state custody.13  The DDA provides that in order for state 
advocacy systems to receive funding they must “have authority to 
investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals if the incidents 
                                                                                                                                     
 9 Virginia v. Reinhard, No. 3:07cv734, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *1–2 (E.D. 
Va. July 18, 2008), rev’d, 568 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 10 Id. at *2. The relevant Virginia statute establishing VOPA provides, “The 
Department for Rights of Virginians with Disabilities is hereby established as an 
independent state agency to be known as the Virginia Office for Protection and 
Advocacy. The Office is designated as the agency to protect and advocate for the rights 
of persons with mental, cognitive, sensory, physical or other disabilities and to receive 
federal funds on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia to implement the federal 
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, the federal 
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the federal Rehabilitation 
Act, the Virginians with Disabilities Act and such other related programs as may be 
established by state and federal law.”  Va. Code. Ann. § 51.5-39.2 (2009). 
 11 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2 (citing Development Disabilities 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15001, et. seq. (2006), and its 
implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 1385, et. Seq. (2008); Protection and Advocacy 
for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. (2006)). 
 12 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 114 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001–15115; 42 U.S.C. §§ 
10801–10851). 
 13 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043, 10805; Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-39.4 (2009)). 
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are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that 
such incidents occurred.”14  The PAIMI similarly provides that advocacy 
systems have the authority to “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect 
of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the 
system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents 
occurred.”15   In addition, federal law allows such agencies to access the 
records of individuals subject to investigation under certain 
circumstances, such as where the agency has probable cause to believe 
the individual has suffered abuse or neglect.16  The DDA provides that 
advocacy systems shall “have access to all the records of any individual 
with a developmental disability in a situation in which a complaint has 
been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status 
or treatment of that individual . . . or there is probable cause to believe 
that such individual has been subject to neglect or abuse.”17 Similarly, 
the PAIMI grants systems authority to “have access to all records of any 
individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts 
are unknown) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the 
system or with respect to whom . . . there is probable cause to believe 
that such individual has been the subject of abuse or neglect.”18 
 In Reinhard, VOPA sought declaratory and injunctive relief to 
enforce these provisions for access to records.19  Specifically, VOPA 
sought access to records relating to certain deaths and injuries of 
individuals in the custody of DMHRSAS and residing at CVTC and 
CSH.20 DMHMRSAS responded that the records were protected under 
Virginia’s peer review privilege and refused to provide them to VOPA.21  
                                                                                                                                     
 14 42 U.S.C. § 15043(B). 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). 
 16 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2–3 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043, 
10805, 10806). 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(I)(ii)(III). 
 18 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(iii). The applicable federal regulations essentially 
restate this grant of authority to investigate where probable cause of abuse or neglect 
exists. 42 C.F.R. 51.41(b)(2)(iii). A subsequent provision states that “‘records”‘ includes 
reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment or reports prepared 
by an agency charged with investigating reports or incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury 
occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at 
such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning 
records.”  42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(3)(A). 
 19 See Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *2, 3–4. 
 20 Id. at *3. 
 21 Id. Presumably DMHMRSAS was arguing privilege under Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
581.17 which provides, “The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any (i) 
medical staff committee, utilization review committee, or other committee, board, group, 
commission or other entity as specified in § 8.01-581.16; (ii) nonprofit entity that 
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Whether DMHRSAS could assert this privilege seems subject to doubt 
because the reports in question arguably were not prepared for quality 
assurance.22  The court, however, did not address the merits of the 
privilege assertion.23  Subsequently, VOPA brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the 
respective officers of the three agencies in their official capacities, 
asserting that they were violating federal law by refusing to turn over the 
records.24  The officers filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing 
inter alia that sovereign immunity prohibited VOPA from suing the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in federal district court without its consent.25  
The Eastern District of Virginia thus initially confronted the issue of 
whether one state administrative agency could hail another agency from 
the same state into federal court consistent with sovereign immunity. 
                                                                                                                                     
provides a centralized credentialing service; or (iii) quality assurance, quality of care, or 
peer review committee established pursuant to guidelines approved or adopted by (a) a 
national or state physician peer review entity, (b) a national or state physician 
accreditation entity, (c) a national professional association of health care providers or 
Virginia chapter of a national professional association of health care providers, (d) a 
licensee of a managed care health insurance plan (MCHIP) as defined in § 38.2-5800, (e) 
the Office of Emergency Medical Services or any regional emergency medical services 
council, or (f) a statewide or local association representing health care providers licensed 
in the Commonwealth, together with all communications, both oral and written, 
originating in or provided to such committees or entities, are privileged communications 
which may not be disclosed or obtained by legal discovery proceedings unless a circuit 
court, after a hearing and for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being 
shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings, minutes, records, reports, or 
communications . . . Oral communications regarding a specific medical incident 
involving patient care, made to a quality assurance, quality of care, or peer review 
committee established pursuant to clause (iii), shall be privileged only to the extent made 
more than 24 hours after the occurrence of the medical incident.”  Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
581.17(B) (2007). 
 22 See Witzke v. Martha Jefferson Surgery Ctr., L.L.C., 70 Va. Cir. 217 (Albemarle 
County 2006). 
 23 Indeed, the merits DMHMRSAS’s assertion of peer review privilege was not 
crucial to the real issue of whether a state agency could sue another state agency under Ex 
Parte Young. At no point did the courts suggest that DMHMRSAS’s refusal to turn over 
the reports based on privielege as opposed to some other reason was material to the 
outcome of the case. 
 24 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *3–4. 
 25 See id. at *4. As discussed further below, although VOPA had in fact brought suit 
against officers of a state administrative agency, the United States Supreme Court has 
long recognized that a suit against an officer acting under authority of state law, who has 
no personal interest in the case, is for all intents and purposes a suit against the state 
itself. See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 151 (1908) (internal citations omitted). 
Therefore, in suing the officers of DMHMRSAS, CVTC, and CSH, VOPA was suing the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in federal district court. 
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 Judge Payne prefaced his analysis by stating the general rule that 
states enjoy sovereign immunity from private suits, a proposition for 
which he cited to Alden v. Maine, one of the more recent landmark 
sovereign immunity cases.26  Drawing on United States Supreme Court 
precedent, he then proceeded to outline the recognized exceptions to 
sovereign immunity.27  Having dispensed with other exceptions, the court 
proceeded to consider whether Ex Parte Young applied and allowed 
VOPA to bring suit against Virginia.28  Judge Payne prefaced his Ex 
Parte Young analysis by acknowledging that VOPA had brought action 
against state officials in their official capacities, a necessary “predicate” 
for the exception.29  VOPA argued that under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, 
its complaint fairly pled the Ex Parte Younger exception because it 
alleged a continuing violation of federal law and sought injunctive 
relief.30   Judge Payne concluded that under the Verizon Maryland v. 
Public Service Commission standard, the Ex Parte Young doctrine 
applied and the case could proceed.31  In alleging that the defendants 
refused to provide the records as required by the statutes, VOPA had 
                                                                                                                                     
 26 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *7 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999)). 
 27 Id. at *7–8 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized two 
exceptions to sovereign immunity in addition to Ex Parte Young. First, Congress may 
abrogate state sovereign immunity if it acts pursuant to its enforcement power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and “it has ‘unequivocally expressed its intent to 
abrogate the immunity’” in the relevant statute. Id. at *7 (quoting Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 59 (1996)). Second, states may voluntarily waive 
sovereign immunity either by consenting to suit or by accepting federal funding that is 
expressly conditioned waiver. Id. at *8 (citing College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)). 
 28 Abrogation was not applicable to the case because the federal enabling statutes 
contained no express language providing for abrogation. See id. at *8; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15001, et. seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et. seq. As to waiver, the court set out the 
requirement that Congress must explicitly state that receipt of federal funding under the 
statute in question depends on consent to suit to secure waiver. Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 54922, at *8 (quoting Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
Based on Fourth Circuit precedent, Judge Payne determined that in order to secure 
waiver, a statutory provision must actually use the term “sovereign immunity” to signal 
to states their consent to suit. Thus, the provision on which VOPA relied did not convey 
the “requisite expression of ‘a clear intent to condition participation . . . on a State’s 
consent to waive its constitutional immunity.’”  Id. at *12–13 (citing Madison, 474 F.3d 
at 131). 
 29 Id. at *14. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *16 (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public 
Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Under Verizon, in order to overcome a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in an Ex Parte Young action, the plaintiff must plead an 
ongoing violation of federal law by a state actor and seek prospective injunctive relief. Id. 
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alleged an ongoing violation of federal law.32  Moreover, because VOPA 
sought an injunction, it sought only prospective relief—that the 
defendants release the records.33 
 As a final consideration, Judge Payne addressed whether 
VOPA’s claim implicated Virginia’s “special sovereignty interest” which 
would remove the case from the Ex Parte Young exception under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho.34  
The defendants posited that federal courts could not intervene in an 
intramural dispute between administrative agencies or branches within a 
state government because such disputes implicated internal government 
processes, a vital sphere of state sovereignty.35  VOPA responded that 
this argument transcended the recognized limits of special sovereign 
interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.36  Judge Payne agreed 
that the case did not implicate Virginia’s special sovereignty interests.37  
He observed that cases where federal courts should bow out due to 
special sovereignty interests are those involving issues “that are uniquely 
a state’s concern, most commonly the state’s internal budgetary 
arrangements.”38  By contrast, the administration of a federal program 
did not interfere with any state sovereign prerogative.39 
 Judge Payne relied on Antrican v. Odom, in which the Fourth 
Circuit held that sovereign immunity did not bar a suit to enjoin 
                                                                                                                                     
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. As explained further below, only suits for prospective injunctive relief are 
permitted under Ex Parte Young because monetary damages would assuredly be paid out 
of the state treasury; therefore, the state would be the true party in interest and the fiction 
of Ex Parte Young would break down. 
 34 See id. As discussed further below, in Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, the 
United States Supreme Court based its decision that the Ex Parte Young exception did not 
apply on the premise that land ownership was a strong sovereign interest retained by the 
state and that interference with that interest would be “as intrusive as almost any 
conceivable retroactive levy upon the funds of the Treasury.”  Coeur d’Alene Tribe of 
Idaho, 521 U.S. at 287–88. The Court also made clear that “[w]here, as here, the parties 
invoke federal principles to challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State 
have a strong interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for the 
proper judicial control of state officials.”  Id. at 276. 
 35 Id. at *16–17. 
 36 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *17. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (citing Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986, 998, 989 
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that whether taxes for desegregation should fall on the state or 
individual school districts was an internal dispute between two government entities which 
a federal court should not adjudicate); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 84 F.3d 
707, 716 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to interfere in state finances); Harris v. Angelina 
County, 31 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 39 See id. at *18–19 (citing Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 189 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
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compliance with the Medicare Act because “‘[a] state’s interest in 
administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal 
government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude 
application of Ex Parte Young.’”40  The court observed, “Defendants 
would have this Court refrain from deciding any cases brought by a state 
agency against another state agency. However, Defendants have cited no 
decision which supports such a broad rule. It is the nature of the issue to 
be decided, not who brings the suit that potentially implicates 
sovereignty interests.”41  Thus, Judge Payne held that the case could 
proceed. In so doing, he found that the application of the Ex Parte Young 
exception did not depend on the identity of the plaintiffs.  Rather, the 
nature of the action governed the exception Virginia, however, swiftly 
appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which would review the district court’s decision de 
novo.42  
B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s Decision 
 A three judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
prefaced its decision by confirming, “State sovereign immunity is a 
bedrock principle of ‘Our Federalism.’”43  In so doing, the Court of 
Appeals signaled its intention to take a broad approach to state sovereign 
immunity, drawing on the structural principles defining the Supreme 
Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence.  Continuing, it cited to Supreme 
Court precedent for the proposition that sovereign immunity’s central 
purpose “‘is to “accord the States the respect owed them as” joint 
sovereigns.’”44  Upon entering the union, the states retained certain 
                                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. at *19 (quoting Antrican, 290 F.3d at 189). 
 41 Reinhard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *19. 
 42 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 115. 
 43 Id. (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). In Younger, the United 
States Supreme Court expounded on the notion of “Our Federalism:” “The concept does 
not mean blind deference to ‘States Rights’ any more than it means centralization of 
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts . . . What 
the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate 
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National 
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal 
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States.”  Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Based on this concept, the 
Supreme Court held that a federal injunction against a state prosecution under a facially 
unconstitutional statute was not an appropriate use of the Ex Parte Younger doctrine. Id. 
at 49, 52–53. Thus, from the start, the Court of Appeals signaled its intention to leave 
internal state processes free from intervention by federal courts. 
 44 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 115 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 
535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)). 
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crucial attributes of sovereignty, one of which is immunity from suit 
without their consent.45  The Court of Appeals, however, recognized the 
three major exceptions to sovereign immunity: congressional abrogation, 
waiver, and the Ex Parte Young doctrine.46  Because the parties agreed 
that Virginia’s sovereign immunity barred VOPA’s suit against the 
agency officials absent one of the exceptions, the Court of Appeals, like 
the district court below, proceeded to consider the exceptions’ 
applicability in turn.47   The core of the decision, however, focused on Ex 
Parte Young. 
 VOPA continued to argue that under the Verizon standard, Ex 
Parte Young applied to its suit because it had alleged an ongoing 
violation of federal law by the defendants’ failure to turn over the records 
and it sought prospective injunctive relief.48  To this the Court of Appeals 
responded that “it is hardly so simple,” signaling a departure from the 
cursory analysis of Judge Payne below.49  The Court of Appeals 
elaborated: 
[T]his case differs from Ex Parte Young in a critical 
respect: the plaintiff there was not a state agency. 
Instead, the plaintiffs in Ex Parte Young were private 
parties. And while no subsequent decision has 
                                                                                                                                     
 45 Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 714, 715–19; Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751–
52; Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 54). The Court of Appeals, thus, alluded to 
Supreme Court precedent recognizing that sovereign immunity rests on constitutional 
structure and extends beyond the limited language of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 46 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 47 Id. (internal citations omitted). Beginning with abrogation, the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the district court that this exception did not apply because Congress did not 
unequivocally express its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the statutory 
language. Id. at 115–16 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). 
The Court of Appeals, however, was quick to clarify that it was not holding that Congress 
could not abrogate sovereign immunity under the present facts. Id. at 116. Both the 
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a valid grant of constitutional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity to 
protect the rights of disabled persons. Id. (citing United States v. Georgia, 547 U.S. 151, 
159 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004); Constantine v. Rectors & 
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005)). With this extended 
treatment of abrogation, the Court of Appeals cautiously reassured the federal 
government that it was not powerless to enforce federal rights and protection advocacy 
systems by enabling private individuals to bring suit in federal court. However, the Court 
of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision. Likewise, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court’s decision on waiver without any significant departure from its reasoning. 
See id. at 116–17. Again, however, the Court of Appeals was cautious to reassure 
Congress that it could extract waiver from the states under the present circumstances. See 
id. at 118. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 118. 
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expressly limited the application of Ex Parte Young to 
suit by a private plaintiff, many decisions have 
recognized this basic element of the doctrine . . . 
VOPA has cited no case, nor have we found any 
holding that—or even analyzing whether—the Ex 
Parte Young doctrine applies equally when the 
plaintiff is a state agency.50 
 Thus, the Court of Appeals incorporated a new limitation to 
application of Ex Parte Young in addition to those recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Verizon: the plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive 
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law must be a private individual 
and not a state government agency.  To support this new limitation on Ex 
Parte Young, the Court of Appeals drew primarily on historical and 
structural analysis which has characterized the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence in the area of federalism. 
 Drawing from the Supreme Court’s historical analysis in Alden 
v. Maine, the Court of Appeals initially posited that the absence of prior 
case law recognizing Ex Parte Young in the context of a state agency 
plaintiff is significant because states retain immunity from actions that 
were “‘anomalous and unheard of when the constitution was adopted.’”51  
The Court of Appeals adopted the Supreme Court’s recent assumption 
                                                                                                                                     
 50 Id. (citing Semiole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (“[A]n individual can bring 
suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer’s conduct is in compliance 
with federal law . . . .”); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (referring to Ex Parte Young suits 
by “private individuals”); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 143). 
 51 Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999)). In Alden v. Maine, the 
Supreme Court rendered a sovereign immunity decision that appeared to pay significant 
homage to the anti-commandeering line of cases discussed further in section III below. 
Having determined in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida that Article I did not grant 
Congress authority to abrogate sovereign immunity in federal courts, the Court 
confronted the novel issue of whether it gave Congress the power to subject 
nonconsenting states to suit in their own courts. See id. at 741.  The Court harkened to 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 14 (1992) and United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 818 
(1997) for the principle that states maintain a concurrent power to affect citizens. Id. at 
713, 730. The Supreme Court asserted that the “power to press a State’s own courts into 
federal service to coerce the other branches of the State . . . is the power first to turn the 
State against itself and ultimately commandeer the entire political machinery of the State 
against its will and at the behest of individuals.”  Id. at 749 (citing Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
521 U.S. at 276). Moreover, the Court found that federal power to subject states to suit 
raised the political accountability problems recognized in the anti-commandeering cases. 
See id. at 750. Drawing again on Printz, the Court asserted that when the federal 
government asserts control over the state’s internal political processes, it interferes with 
the states’ ability to remain accountable to their own citizens.  Id. at 751 (citing Printz, 
521 U.S. at 920). In light of these structural considerations, the Supreme Court held that 
states retain sovereign immunity from private suit in their own courts which Congress 
cannot abrogate under Article I. Id. at 754. 
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that ratification essentially froze the boundaries of sovereign immunity at 
their contemporaneous reaches.  Although below Judge Payne had cited 
cases addressing the merits of Ex Parte Young actions where the plaintiff 
was an agency, the Court of Appeals distinguished these cases because 
the plaintiffs were in fact not public agencies, but private advocacy 
systems.52  Thus, the Court of Appeals assigned paramount importance to 
the official, public status of the plaintiff agency. VOPA responded that 
the identity of the plaintiff was simply irrelevant.53  The court indicated, 
however, that this dismissive approach ran contrary to the guidelines 
announced in Coeur d’Alene, where the Supreme Court cautioned against 
“‘reflexive reliance’” and “‘empty formalism’” when considering 
application of Ex Parte Young.54  Rather, application of Ex Parte Young 
must account for the structure of the federalist system and the sovereign 
interests at stake.55  Therefore, the court proceeded to consider “whether 
the Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted” when the plaintiff is a 
state agency in light of the structure of dual federalism and the sovereign 
interests of the state.56 
 The Court of Appeals departed from the premise that sovereign 
immunity safeguards the dignity of the states and, therefore, prohibits 
federal courts from intruding into the internal processes and cacophony 
of state government.57  “[F]ederal court adjudication of an ‘intramural 
contest’ between a state agency and state officials encroaches more 
severely on the dignity and sovereignty of the states than an Ex Parte 
Young action brought by a private plaintiff,” reasoned the Court of 
Appeals58  The ability of a state agency to force a state to answer to a 
federal court would constitute a violation of a state’s sovereign dignity.  
Allowing a federal court to act as the referee between two elements of 
fractured state authority would be “antithetical to our system of dual 
                                                                                                                                     
 52 Id. at 118 n.1 (internal citations omitted). 
 53 Id. at 119. 
 54 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 119. (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270, 281). 
 55 Id. (quoting Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270). 
 56 See id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 74). 
 57 Id. at 119–20. 
 58 Id. (citing Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185, 191 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (Wilson, J., concurring). Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. 
Reinhard was a prior case involving the same parties as the case under discussion. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals held that VOPA could not bring a Section 1983 claim against 
the defendants because VOPA was a state agency. Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 120 n. 2. 
Although the case did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity, Judge Wilson observed 
that such an action brought by a state agency against a state in federal court constituted a 
serious indignity to the state. Id. 
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sovereignty.”59  Sovereign immunity shields the states from “federal 
meddling” in their internal affairs.60 As support for this proposition, the 
court drew primarily on the Alden decision’s expansive language 
regarding the protection of state government machinery.61 
 The Alden Court based its holding that Article I did not give 
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in states’ own 
courts on the aphorism that such abrogation power would constitute the 
power “to turn the State against itself and ultimately commandeer the 
political machinery of the State against its will.”62  By requiring state 
courts to hear cases against state officers, Congress was essentially 
playing the state judiciaries off of state legislatures and executives. 
Giving the federal government such power “‘would strike at the heart of 
political accountability so essential to our liberty and republican form of 
government.’”63  The Court of Appeals perceived a comparable danger in 
allowing a state agency to bring suit against another state agency in 
federal court under Ex Parte Young.  Federal courts would essentially 
have the power to play state agencies off of each other, which would 
result in indignity to the states.64  Moreover, allowing federal courts to 
serve this mediating function between state agencies would undermine 
political accountability because state citizens dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the federal court’s decision would have nowhere to turn for 
redress.65  Presumably, the court meant that the normal pressures 
inherent in the electoral process normally applicable to state actors and 
bodies would be useless against the federal judiciary.  Thus, implicitly 
drawing on Alden and the anti-commandeering line of cases discussed 
further below, the Court of Appeals perceived the danger that federal 
interference in conflicts between state agencies could displace the normal 
processes of state government. 
 Here, the Court of Appeals arguably overlooked the argument 
that citizens and states would have recourse to Congress.  If dissatisfied 
with a federal court’s interpretation of federal law, citizens could lobby 
their national representatives to change federal law.  The Court of 
Appeals, however, may have been accounting for such barriers as 
legislative inertia and the fact that the few interested parties in any given 
                                                                                                                                     
 59 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 120. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 749). 
 63 Id. (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 751). 
 64 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 121. 
 65 Id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 751). 
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case might not have sufficient political leverage to affect such a redress. 
Convincing Congress to change the law could be a difficult hill to climb 
especially when the greater costs of the law are not immediately apparent 
to the public.  The Court of Appeals, however, did not limit its rationale 
to the political accountability principles underlying the anti-
commandeering line. It also found that VOPA’s action raised special 
sovereignty interests crucial to the dignity of the states.  
 In a separate section of the opinion, the Court of Appeals also 
found that a suit under Ex parte Young in these circumstances would 
implicate special sovereignty interests similar to those identified by the 
Supreme Court in Coeur d’Alene.66  Citing to a series of cases holding 
that municipalities political subdivisions of states could not obtain relief 
under federal law against the application of state statutes, the Court of 
Appeals suggested that states have special sovereignty interests in 
“intramural state conflicts” with which federal courts should not 
interfere.67  Based largely on these anti-commandeering and special 
sovereignty principles incorporated into sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence in Alden and Coeur d’Alene, the Court of Appeals 
determined that Ex Parte Young should not be extended to cases with 
state agencies on opposing sides.68  Arguably, Reinhard implicated a 
Congressional interest not present in Coeur d’Alene. In Coeur d’Alene, 
the plaintiff challenged state violation of a federal statute fixing the 
boundaries of an Indian Reservation.69  In Reinhard, on the other hand, 
VOPA challenged state violation of federal laws intended to promote 
equal treatment for disabled and mentally ill persons, implicating 
Congress’ supreme power under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nowhere 
in Coeur d’Alene, however, did the court suggest that sovereign 
immunity depended on weighing the relative strength of state interests 
against federal interests.  Rather, the court simply announced that when 
an action under Ex Parte Young intrudes on states’ special sovereignty 
interests, the exception should not apply. 
 The Court of Appeals reiterated as a final observation, however, 
that all of these problems could be avoided by either proper 
congressional abrogation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                                     
 66 Id. at 121–23 (internal citations omitted). 
 67 Id. at 122 – 23 (citing Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 53 S. Ct. 431, 77 
L. Ed. 1015 (1933); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S. Ct. 534, 67 L. 
Ed. 937 (1923); Stewart v. City of Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S. Ct. 15, 60 L. Ed. 120 
(1915); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907)). 
 68 Id. at 121. 
 69 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 264. 
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Amendment or valid waiver.70  In such circumstances, citizens could 
hold Congress or state governments accountable for the results of 
litigation between state agencies.71  Moreover, such suits would impart 
no indignity to the states because the states would have consented either 
through their Congressional representatives or by accepting conditional 
federal resources.72  Thus, the court seemed to suggest that Congress 
should vindicate federal interests through abrogation or waiver and not 
Ex Parte Young.  As shown, the Court of Appeals rested its decision on 
the abstract structural theory that has characterized the Supreme Court’s 
recent federalism. Indeed, the underlying rationale of Reinhard proves 
difficult to comprehend without a thorough examination of the Supreme 
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  Recently, the Court has 
incorporated the anti-commandeering principles of political 
accountability into sovereign immunity.  In addition, it has recognized 
unique sovereign interests that should remain free of federal 
adjudication.  These more recent theories form the basis of Reinhard. 
The origins of the sovereign immunity doctrine, however, are the proper 
starting point for this examination. 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE 
APPLIED IN REINHARD 
A. The Early Development of Sovereign Immunity and the Ex Parte 
Young Doctrine 
 The origins of sovereign immunity extend back to ancient 
English common law, certain remnants of which prevailed at the time of 
ratification.73  The consensus among the Founders appeared to be that the 
states retained their sovereign immunity after ratification as an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty.74  The passage of the Eleventh Amendment and 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana 
confirmed that states have retained their sovereign immunity in our 
system.  Thus, although sovereign immunity derives from ancient 
                                                                                                                                     
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: NEW 
FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 71–80 (Carolina Academic Press, 2005); Alfred Hill, In Defense 
of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 493–98 (2001). Under the 
ancient common law of England, the sovereign could not be sued in courts which it had 
created by its own power. 
 74 Hill, supra note 73, at 495–98. 
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traditions, it has to some extent been incorporated into the Constitution.75  
Although the Supreme Court has sometimes conceptualized sovereign 
immunity as emanating from the Eleventh Amendment, it has made clear 
that sovereign immunity extends beyond that limited language.  Thus, 
although paid homage and incorporated by the Constitution, sovereign 
immunity derives from ancient, fundamental principles of government.  
As such its precise contours prove amorphous and difficult to define. The 
Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”76  To the Supreme 
Court fell the task of determining the precise limits imposed on federal 
jurisdiction by this language and the constitutional structure. 
 In Hans, a Louisiana citizen had brought suit in federal court 
against the state of Louisiana, alleging that an amendment to the state 
constitution, prohibiting the state from paying interest on certain bonds, 
violated the Contracts Clause of the federal Constitution.77  The Supreme 
Court, therefore, confronted the novel question of whether a state could 
be sued by one of its own citizens in federal court because the case arises 
under the Constitution or federal law.78  At this point, the Court’s 
decisions had established that the Eleventh Amendment prevented a state 
from being sued in federal court by a citizen of another state or a foreign 
country based on federal question jurisdiction.79  The plaintiff claimed 
that because he was a citizen of Louisiana, he did not fall into either of 
these prohibited categories and could bring suit against his own state.80 
 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, finding 
that the Eleventh Amendment stood for a prohibition far broader than its 
simple language.81  With the Eleventh Amendment, “[a]ny such power as 
that of authorizing the federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals 
against the States, had been expressly disclaimed.”82  The Court further 
                                                                                                                                     
 75 See Jonathan Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L. J. 1167, 1173–75 (2003). 
 76 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. 
 77 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 973 (5th ed. 2003). 
 78 Hans, 134 U.S. at 9 (1890). 
 79 Id. at 10 (citing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); Hagood v. Southern, 117 
U.S. 52 (1886); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 12, 13–16. The Court asserted that the passage of the Eleventh Amendment 
signaled acceptance of Justice Iredell’s dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia, positing that a 
state simply cannot be sued without its consent. Id. at 16. 
 82 Id. at 12, 15. 
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announced, “It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amendable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . and the 
exemption . . . is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the 
Union.”83  Thus, sovereign immunity derived not so much from the 
actual text of the Eleventh Amendment but from the inherent nature of 
sovereign statehood.  The Supreme Court thus incorporated ancient, 
common law notions of sovereignty into the constitutional structure.  
Recognizing the clear tension between sovereign immunity and the 
supremacy of federal law, the Court asserted: 
The legislative department of a State represents its 
polity and its will; and is called upon by the highest 
demands of natural and political law to preserve 
justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate public 
obligations . . . But to deprive the legislature of the 
power of judging what the honor and safety of the 
State may require, even at the expense of a temporary 
failure to discharge public debts, would be attended 
with greater evils than such failure can cause.84 
 In the Court’s view, the state legislature, directly accountable to 
the citizens of a state, must maintain control of the state fisc, free from 
federal intervention.  Hans, therefore, announced the rule that a state is 
not amendable to suit in federal court by its own citizens even in the face 
of a constitutional violation by the state.85 
 Relatively soon after Hans, the Court seemingly sought to 
resolve the tension between expansive sovereign immunity and the 
supremacy of federal law by carving out an exception.  In Ex Parte 
Young, Minnesota shareholders of various railroad corporations brought 
suit in federal court, seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota 
from enforcing state railroad rate regulations.86  The shareholders alleged 
that the regulations were confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.87  The federal trial court entered a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting the attorney general from 
enforcing the regulations, and when he violated the injunction, the 
federal circuit court held him in contempt.88  Throughout the 
proceedings, the attorney general maintained that the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                                     
 83 Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. 
 84 Id. at 21. 
 85 See id. 
 86 John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 992 (2008). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908); Harrison, supra note 86, at 993. 
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Amendment barred the plaintiff’s suit against him because it effectively 
constituted an action by citizens against their own state.89  The Supreme 
Court reviewed the trial court’s determination. The Court recognized that 
a suit against state officers who have no personal stake in the subject 
matter of the suit and defend only as representatives of the state is 
virtually a suit against the state itself.90  Only the state has any real 
interest in the action.  Therefore, although the suit named an individual 
state officer as defendant, it was in fact a suit against Minnesota by 
Minnesota citizens which would appear to fall under the prohibition 
announced in Hans. 
 Through a legal fiction, however, the Court articulated the rule 
of law that a suit against a state officer who is violating federal law is not 
a suit against the state.91 The court reasoned: 
The act to be enforced is alleged to be 
unconstitutional, and if it be so the use of the name of 
the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the 
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the 
authority of and one which does not affect the State in 
its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an 
illegal act upon the part of the state official in 
attempting by the use of the name of the state to 
enforce a legislative enactment which is void because 
it is unconstitutional.92 
 Therefore, a suit against a state officer in violation of federal law 
does not fall within the sovereign immunity prohibition because it is not 
a suit against the state, but a suit against a rogue officer acting without 
state authority because the state has no authority to enact an 
unconstitutional law.  If the rate regulations were in fact unconstitutional, 
then the attorney general “proceeding under such enactment comes into 
conflict with the superior authority of that constitution and he is . . . 
stripped of his representative character and is subjected in his person to 
the consequences of his individual act.”93  Thus, by somewhat 
convoluted logic, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to 
sovereign immunity by which a state citizen may sue a state officer when 
the state officer is violating federal law.  The Supreme Court and 
commentators have consistently labeled this rogue officer theory a “legal 
                                                                                                                                     
 89 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 143–44 (1908). 
 90 Id. at 151 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)). 
 91 See id. at 159–60. 
 92 Id. at 159. 
 93 Id. at 159–60. 
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fiction” because the officer in question is, in fact, acting pursuant to state 
authority.94  Seeming to recognize the precarious footing of this legal 
fiction, the Court subsequently refined the Ex Parte Young doctrine to 
incorporate additional protections for state sovereignty. 
 In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court held that Ex Parte Young only 
created an exception to sovereign immunity for suits brought for 
prospective injunctive relief and not retrospective money damages.95  
There, the plaintiff brought an individual class action against state 
agency officials, alleging that they were violating federal regulations in 
dispensing benefits under the federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, 
Blind, or Disabled.96  Finding the state officers in violation of federal 
regulations, the federal district court granted a permanent injunction 
requiring compliance with the regulations and also ordered the officers to 
pay benefits wrongfully withheld.97  On review, the Supreme Court held 
that Ex Parte Young permitted the element of the judgment that 
constituted a prospective injunction requiring compliance with federal 
law.98  The order to dispense funds, however, constituted retrospective 
relief barred by sovereign immunity.99  The Court explained, “‘[W]hen 
the action is in essence one for recovery of money from the state, the 
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its 
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are the 
nominal defendants.’”100  State immunity barred such retroactive 
monetary relief that would “to a virtual certainty be paid from state 
funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials . . . .”101  
By thus restricting application of Ex Parte Young to suits for prospective 
injunctive remedies, the Supreme Court preserved the fiction that the suit 
was not in fact one against the state. 
 Synthesizing the principles of Ex Parte Young and Edelman, the 
Supreme Court recently articulated a simple formula to determine the 
applicability of the Ex Parte Young doctrine in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission.102  Federal courts must conduct “a 
straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing 
                                                                                                                                     
 94 See Harrison, supra note 86, at 995. 
 95 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–66 (1974). 
 96 Id. at 653. 
 97 Id. at 669. 
 98 Id. at 664. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 
U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). 
 101 Id. at 668. 
 102 Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). 
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violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as 
prospective.”103  Thus, under the Court’s current jurisprudence the Ex 
Parte Young exception to the sovereign immunity bar applies when a 
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against a state officer in violation of 
federal law.  This seemingly simple framework, however, has been 
complicated by two recent lines of cases that exemplify the Supreme 
Court’s revival of federalist principles—the anti-commandeering cases 
and the more recent sovereign immunity cases focusing on abrogation 
and special state sovereign interests.  Examination of these cases 
demonstrates that sovereign immunity implicates far more complex 
issues political accountability and state dignity.  These cases form the 
theoretical basis of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Reinhard. 
B. The Anti-Commandeering Cases and the Modern Expansion of 
Sovereign Immunity  
 In a line of cases that has come to be known as the “anti-
commandeering” cases, the Supreme Court drastically curtailed the 
power of the federal government to interfere in the internal 
administration and process of state governments.104  Although these cases 
did not specifically address sovereign immunity, they mark the Court’s 
adoption of a broad structuralist approach in its federalism jurisprudence 
based on the “‘essential postulates’” of the constitution.105  The Court 
derived limits on the reach of federal authority from the historical 
understanding of the proper relationship between the federal government 
and the states.106  The aphorisms adopted by the Court in these cases 
form a crucial basis of its current sovereign immunity jurisprudence and 
the Reinhard decision.107  Therefore, an understanding of the anti-
                                                                                                                                     
 103 Id. at 645. 
 104 See Jennifer L. Greenblatt, What’s Dignity Got to Do with It?: Using Anti-
Commandeering Principles to Preserve State Sovereign Immunity, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 
11–15 (2008) (internal citations omitted); William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State 
Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 
1073–78 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 105 See generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of 
Structure, 41 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1601 (2000) (observing that these cases mark the 
conservative majority’s turning away from textualism and originalism to jurisprudence 
based on an understanding of the historical relationship between the states and the federal 
government). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737–54 (1999) (consistently relying on Printz 
v. United States); Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 120 (4th Cir. 2009) (relying in 
large part on Alden). 
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commandeering cases is crucial to grasping the Fourth Circuit’s decision.  
Two cases are particularly noteworthy and go practically hand-in-hand. 
 In New York v. United States, the Court addressed the 
constitutional validity of the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendment Act 
of 1985, designed to encourage state level disposal of radioactive 
waste.108 In the statute, Congress essentially sought to force states to 
dispose of waste by either joining regional compacts with other states or 
providing a disposal facility within the state itself.109  To this end, the 
statute provided inter alia that if a state did not dispose of waste through 
one of these two options by a certain date, the state would essentially 
“take title” to the waste and be liable for any damages flowing from it.110  
New York argued that this provision impermissibly directed the states to 
regulate waste disposal in contravention of the principal of dual 
sovereignty.111  The precise issue, therefore, was whether Congress could 
direct the states to regulate in a particular manner.112  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor initially stated that “Congress may not 
simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”113  
While Congress undoubtedly can act directly on the citizens in “areas of 
intimate concern to the states,” Congress cannot order the states to 
govern in accordance with its will.114  The Court reasoned: 
In providing for a stronger central government, 
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution 
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate 
individuals, not States. As we have seen, the Court 
has consistently respected this choice. We have 
always understood that even where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring 
or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly 
                                                                                                                                     
 108 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–51 (1992) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 109 See id. 151–52 (internal citations omitted). 
 110 Id. at 153–54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1992)). 
 111 Id. at 159–60 (internal citations omitted). 
 112 Id. at 161. 
 113 New York, 505 U.S. at 161.(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981)). 
 114 Id. at 162. 
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to compel the States to require or prohibit those 
acts.115 
 Thus, Congress cannot compel the states to create administrative 
agencies and thereby indirectly regulate state citizens.  The Court 
explained that these limits of dual sovereignty are crucial to the political 
accountability of both state and federal officials.116  If state citizens deem 
federal policy contrary to their interests or decide that resources are 
better expended elsewhere, they are free to elect state representatives 
who will decline to participate in a federal regulatory program.117  In that 
case, if the federal government decides to overpower state objections by 
regulating citizens directly, it may do so “in full view of the public, and it 
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns 
out to be detrimental or unpopular.”118  On the other hand, if the federal 
government can commandeer the state machinery and compel state 
legislatures to regulate, state representatives will face public hostility, 
and federal officials can insulate themselves from the electoral 
consequences of their actions.119  Therefore, allowing Congress to 
conscript the state legislatures into doing its “dirty work” would 
essentially undermine the popular check on federal representatives.  By 
giving states the ultimatum of either complying with federal regulations 
or taking title to radioactive waste and suffering the hazardous 
consequences, the statute coerced the states to act and commandeered 
state governments.120  Thus, the particular provision in question was 
beyond the powers of the federal government.121  Congress cannot 
commandeer state legislatures to implement federal policy through state 
regulations. 
 Shortly thereafter, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court 
considered substantially the same issue as applied to state executive 
officers.122  In Printz, the Court addressed the constitutionality of certain 
interim provisions of the 1993 amendments to the Gun Control Act of 
                                                                                                                                     
 115 Id. at 166 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 762–66; Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. at 288–89; Lane County v. Oregon, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76, 19 L. Ed. 101). 
 116 Id. at 168. 
 117 Id. 
 118 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 119 Id. at 169 (citing Merritt, 88 COLUM. L. REV., at 61–62; La Pierre, Political 
Accountability in the National Political Process—The Alternative to Judicial Review of 
Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 639–65 (1985)). 
 120 Id. at 175–76. 
 121 Id. at 176. 
 122 Printz, 521 U.S. 818, 902 (1997); see also Greenblatt, supra note 104, at 14–15. 
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1968.123  These interim provisions required the chief law enforcement 
officers (“CLEOs”) of state municipalities to conduct background 
investigations of individuals seeking to purchase handguns.124  The 
provisions, thus, directed state law enforcement officers to administer 
federal regulations.125  The petitioners argued that such congressional 
action compelling state officers to execute federal laws violated the 
constitution.126  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia analyzed the 
question in light of “historical understanding and practice” and the 
“structure of the Constitution.”127  He first found that such use of state 
officials by the federal government was contrary to the framework of 
dual federalism.  The Court initially recognized that “the Framers 
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and 
through the States, and instead designed a system in which the state and 
federal governments would exercise concurrent authority over the 
people.”128  The Constitution contemplates a system “‘establishing two 
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own 
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who 
sustain it and are governed by it.’”129  The states, therefore, retain a 
residual sovereign sphere of action, and “[i]t is no more compatible with 
this independence and autonomy that their officers be dragooned . . . into 
administering federal law, than it would be compatible with the 
independence and autonomy of the United States that its officers be 
impressed into service for the execution of state laws.”130 
 In addition, the Court quickly shot down the United States’ 
assertion that requiring state officers to perform ministerial tasks did not 
raise the same accountability dangers as coercion of state legislatures in 
New York.131  By requiring state governments to absorb the 
administrative costs attending enforcement of federal laws, federal 
                                                                                                                                     
 123 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–03. The 1993 amendments were collectively known as the 
“Brady Act.” Id. at 902. 
 124 Id. at 903 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1997)). Specifically, the provisions 
required CLEOs to “‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days 
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law, including 
research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a 
national system designated by the Attorney General.’”  Id. 
 125 Id. at 904. 
 126 Id. at 905. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (citing The Federalist, No. 15, at 109). 
 129 Id. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 130 Id. at 928. 
 131 Id. at 929–30. 
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representatives could claim credit for solving policy problems without 
requiring their constituencies provide the necessary funding.132  By 
requiring the states to do the “dirty work,” Congress could reap all of the 
benefits with none of the electoral costs that usually come with tough 
policy decisions.  Even if no substantial monetary costs attend 
enforcement of the federal scheme, the states may still take the blame for 
the burdens and defects that attend such a scheme.133  Therefore, the 
same basic problem of political accountability present in the legislative 
context in New York applies likewise in the executive context.  Congress 
can come up with complex and potentially costly regulatory schemes and 
make the states “play the bad guys” by enforcing them.  The Supreme 
Court, therefore, reaffirmed that “‘[t]he Federal Government may not 
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program” 
and held that the interim provisions violated this rule.134  The federal 
government cannot compel the states to enact a federal regulatory 
program and cannot “circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
State’s officers directly.”135  Subsequently, in Alden, the Supreme Court 
would incorporate the “essential postulates” laid out in New York and 
Printz into its sovereign immunity jurisprudence, greatly expanding the 
sovereign immunity bar.136  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alluded 
to these anti-commandeering principles in Reinhard and identified 
political accountability problems as one major peril of allowing federal 
courts to mediate power struggles between rival state agencies.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence has 
adopted a distinct theoretical nuance, likewise not lost on the Reinhard 
court.  Under this line of decisions, a category of unique, core state 
government functions remains outside the Ex Parte Young orbit. 
 The seminal case on special sovereignty interests, decided 
exactly one week prior to Printz, while not explicitly relying on the anti-
commandeering line, certainly proved consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of the structural approach to issues of dual federalism.  
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, the Court adopted new 
limitations on the Ex Parte Young doctrine, partially relied on by the 
                                                                                                                                     
 132 Id. at 930. 
 133 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930 (citing Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a 
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1580, n. 65 (1994)). 
 134 Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188). 
 135 Id. at 935. 
 136 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 714, 731, 748, 751, 752, 754 (1999) (citing 
Printz and New York). 
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Fourth Circuit in Reinhard.137  The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”) 
asserted ownership of the submerged lands and banks of all navigable 
waters within the original boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation 
as established by federal statute.138  The Tribe brought suit in federal 
court against the State of Idaho and various state agencies and 
officials.139  It sought a declaratory injunction that it was entitled to 
exclusive use and enjoyment of the lands in question and a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the state from regulating its exclusive use and 
occupancy.140  The defendants argued that sovereign immunity barred the 
Tribe’s suit against the state and its officers.141  The Supreme Court, 
therefore, addressed the issue of whether the Tribe’s claim could proceed 
under Ex Parte Young.142 
 From the beginning, the Court sought to narrow the gap in 
sovereign immunity created by the exception.  Justice Kennedy observed 
that allowing a claim to proceed in federal court whenever a plaintiff 
sought prospective injunctive relief for a violation of federal law would 
reduce Ex Parte Young to an “empty formalism” and undermine the 
Eleventh Amendment as a real limit on federal question jurisdiction.143  
The Court asserted that “[a]pplication of the Young exception must 
reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and 
respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious 
fiction.”144  Therefore, Ex Parte Young should apply primarily where no 
state forum is available to vindicate the plaintiffs’ federal rights.145 I n 
this case, the Idaho state courts were open to adjudicate the dispute and 
an effective state remedy was available, making a federal forum far less 
necessary.146  Moreover, the Court emphasized that “[n]either in theory 
or in practice has it been shown problematic to have federal claims 
resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity would be 
                                                                                                                                     
 137 See Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270–71, 275–81, 281–
82 (1997); Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 119 (relying on Coeur d’Alene). 
 138 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 264. The Tribe advanced several theories of its 
ownership, including aboriginal right, which are not terribly important for the purposes of 
this paper. 
 139 Id. at 265. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id. The Supreme Court previously had recognized that Indian tribes maintained 
the same status as foreign sovereigns, against whom the states enjoy Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Therefore, the Tribe’s suit against Idaho did raise the sovereign 
immunity issue. Id. at 268–69. 
 142 See id. at 263, 266. 
 143 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 270. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 270–71. 
 146 Id. at 274. 
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applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young.”147  In 
fact, to allow a case to proceed in federal court “based on the inherent 
inadequacy of state forums would run counter to the basic principles of 
federalism” because interpretation and application of federal law within 
their own judiciaries is a “proprietary concern” of the states.148  The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly relied on the availability of 
Virginia state forums for its decision in Reinhard.149  The Court of 
Appeals noted, “The state officials concede, and VOPA does not dispute, 
that [it] may bring this suit in state court and obtain the same relief that it 
seeks here.”150  Thus, the Court of Appeals appears to have followed 
Justice Kennedy’s inclination to channel disputes involving state 
administrative agencies into state courts in order to allow states to tailor 
federal law to their unique needs and traditions. 
 In the Reinhard case, for instance, the Virginia courts arguably 
would have been in a better position to reconcile the investigatory 
provisions of the DDA and PAIMIA with Virginia’s peer review 
privilege statute because of its special competence in the area of Virginia 
law.  Indeed, at no point did VOPA argue that the state courts were 
closed to its claim.151  Indeed, the parties agreed that “Virginia’s 
sovereign immunity would not bar an original action by VOPA for a writ 
of mandamus brought in the Virginia Supreme Court.”152  VOPA always 
had the option of proceeding in Virginia courts to obtain access to the 
records.  Indeed, the Supremacy Clause would require Virginia courts to 
enforce the federal rights in question.153  In Testa v. Katt, the Supreme 
Court held that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to adjudicate 
federal causes of action absent a valid excuse such as a lack of judicial 
resources.154  The Court has subsequently clarified that state courts 
cannot discriminate against federal questions based on disagreement with 
the policies embodied in federal law.155  Rather, a state court may only 
refuse to adjudicate and enforce federal rights on the basis of a neutral 
rule of judicial administration.156  Therefore, as long as state courts 
                                                                                                                                     
 147 Id. at 274–75. 
 148 Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 275. 
 149 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123. 
 150 Id. 
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 153 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389, 391, 394 
(1947); Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29). 
 154 Testa, 330 U.S. at 389, 814–15. 
 155 See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371–75 (1990) (internal citations omitted). 
 156 Id. at 374. 
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remained in operation, the Constitution would require them to adjudicate 
a suit arising under federal law and to enforce federal rights.  Thus, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that VOPA’s fears that 
disabled persons could not adequately assert their rights without access 
to federal courts was illusory.157  Absent special circumstances, state 
courts remain obligated to vindicate federal rights.  Thus, VOPA could 
have resorted to Virginia courts to resolve the conflict between the 
federal law and Virginia’s peer review privilege statute.158     
 Some would doubtless argue that the Congress’ passage of the 
Judiciary Act of 1875159 and the subsequent establishment of general 
federal question jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. section 1331 and removal 
jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. section 1441 intended to promote the 
                                                                                                                                     
 157 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123. 
 158 At least one of the attorneys for VOPA has called this assertion into question. See 
E-mail from Seth Galantar, Of Counsel, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to Harrison Gates, 
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federal claim. E-mail from Seth Galantar, Of Counsel, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to 
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under the Testa line of cases, state cannot assert its sovereign immunity against a federal 
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federal causes of action based only on the content of federal law. 496 U.S. at 371–75. The 
Supreme Court should work to bring bring these inconsistencies into alignment. 
 159 Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). 
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uniformity of federal law by circumventing divergent state interpretation 
of federal law envisioned by Justice Kennedy.160  Indeed, the driving 
purpose behind the Judiciary Act of 1875—the forerunner to modern 
federal question and removal jurisdiction—was to promote uniform 
application of federal laws in an increasingly nationalized commercial 
setting.161  General federal question jurisdiction, however, is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the more narrow restraints of the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  First, numerous 
scholars have argued that the concern driving the Judiciary Act of 1875 
was not so much the need to vindicate individual federal rights against 
the states, but to avoid the prejudice to private business prevailing in 
state courts applying federal law.162  Thus, initially relegating citizens’ 
suits against states for violations of federal law to state courts does not 
run counter to federal question jurisdiction’s more general objective of 
opening the federal courts to suits arising under federal law between 
private individuals.  Second, the Supreme Court addressed the 
implications of the Judiciary Act of 1875 in Hans v. Louisiana.163  In 
                                                                                                                                     
 160 See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
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their height in state and local governments. Id. at 727–28 (citing Friedman, supra, at 
391). Congress, therefore, “appreciated the business community’s ‘unwillingness . . . to 
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them as one of the beneficiaries of the federal question removal provisions.”  Id. at 728 
(citing Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 65 n.31). Although the passage of the Judiciary 
Act of 1875 was contemporaneous with the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and other statutes 
designed to protect individual federal rights, most of these statutes included their own 
jurisdictional provisions. Id. at 727 n.55. Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1875 likely represents 
an expansion of federal jurisdiction in response to state prejudice against growing 
financial and industrial interests as opposed to a superfluous jurisdictional grant to protect 
individual rights. 
 163 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (“The ground taken is that under the 
constitution, as well as under the act of congress passed to carry it into effect, a case is 
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Hans, the Court reasoned that the Act gave federal courts original 
jurisdiction “‘concurrent with the courts of the several states.’”164  
Therefore, because “state courts have no power to entertain suits by 
individuals against a state without its consent” and federal jurisdiction is 
coextensive with that of the states, it follows that federal courts cannot 
take jurisdiction of a suit against a state by an individual.165  Moreover, 
the Court recognized a structural, constitutional prohibition against 
proceedings that were “anomalous” and “unheard of” when the 
constitution was adopted.166 
 Coeur d’Alene and Reinhard, therefore, in channeling suits 
involving state agencies into state courts, have not ignored Congress’ 
policy of uniform application of federal law as reflected in the Judiciary 
Act of 1875.  Rather, the Supreme Court recognized long ago in Hans 
that the authoritative structure of the Constitution confines that policy to 
a certain context.  The Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence has not 
tried to undermine these statutes but merely has recognized that suits 
against the states themselves raise special considerations which elevate 
them above Congress’ preference for strict uniformity.  General federal 
question jurisdiction leaves room for the notion that when a state is sued 
under federal law, it has a proprietary concern in interpreting that law 
itself.  Nowhere in the statutes does Congress expressly abrogate 
sovereign immunity.  Therefore, a better understanding of Justice 
Kennedy’s argument in Coeur d’Alene is that state courts have a strong 
interest in interpreting federal law when it touches on the state’s 
sovereign functions or status. Indeed, Couer d’Alene recognized that the 
state’s interest is particularly strong in the context of complex 
intertwinement of federal law and state administrative law as was present 
in Reinhard.  In sum, a structural, constitutional predilection for “home 
cooking” prevails when a suit against a state implicates its core sovereign 
functions or interests.  Furthermore, as the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals pointed out in Reinhard, the Supreme Court maintains the 
authority to review state court decisions on federal law even if sovereign 
immunity would bar original federal jurisdiction.167  Therefore, federal 
                                                                                                                                     
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, without regard to the character of the parties, 
if it arises under the constitution or laws of the United States . . . The language relied on 
is . . . the corresponding clause of the act conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit court . . . 
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 164 Id. at 18 (quoting 18 Stat. 470 (1875)). 
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 167 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 123 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages 
& Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 30–31 (1989)). 
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courts would always be able to counter state interpretations that strayed 
too far from Congressional intent.  
 The Coeur d’Alene plurality opinion submitted that state courts 
have a special interest in adjudicating claims involving state 
administrative agencies and officials.  The plurality recognized, “It is a 
principal concern of the court system in any State to define and maintain 
a proper balance between the State’s courts on the one hand, and its 
officials and administrative agencies on the other.”168  Indeed, this is 
crucial to the coherent development of administrative law because “state 
courts and state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law 
designed to reflect the State’s own rules and traditions concerning the 
respective scope of judicial review and administrative discretion.”169  The 
plurality went on to identify the present case as one which would give 
states the opportunity to augment administrative law.170  The plurality 
recognized, “Where, as here, the parties invoke federal principles to 
challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong 
interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for 
the proper judicial control of state officials.”171  This concern for 
preserving the healthy “give and take” between state administrative 
agencies and state courts certainly was not lost on the Reinhard court. 
 Justice Kennedy somewhat grudgingly went on to recognize, 
however, that according to precedent, when a plaintiff seeks prospective 
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law, sovereign immunity is not 
a bar.172  He observed, however, that the Ex Parte Young exception may 
not apply when the suit “would ‘upset the balance of federal and state 
interests that it embodies’” because “the exception has been ‘tailored to 
conform as precisely as possible to those situations in which it is 
necessary to vindicate federal rights.’”173  Writing for the majority, 
Kennedy then found that the Tribe’s suit implicated Idaho’s “special 
sovereignty interests” and, therefore, Ex Parte Young should not apply.174  
Idaho had a sovereign interest in its lands and waters which were 
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 172 Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 277. Presumably, Kennedy went on to decide the case 
within the Ex Parte Younger framework because he could not get a majority of the 
justices to agree that the Ex Parte Young exception was simply not applicable. The 
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 173 Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)). 
 174 Id. at 280, 287–88. 
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implicated in the suit.175  Intrusion into such a sacred area of state 
sovereignty would be for more offensive than any retroactive award of 
damages that the Court had prohibited in Edelman.176  Thus, a majority 
of the Court recognized that even where a plaintiff seeks prospective 
relief for an ongoing violation of federal law, Ex Parte Young may be 
inapplicable if the suit implicates special sovereignty interests which are 
within the state’s traditional sphere of control. Moreover, a plurality of 
the Court recognized that state courts have special interests in 
adjudicating disputes centering on administrative law.  The Court of 
Appeals recognized both of these limits to sovereign immunity in 
Reinhard, and grounded its decision on both of them. 
 While the Supreme has yet to expound further on the special 
sovereignty interests that it identified in Coeur d’Alene, multiple circuit 
courts of appeals have weighed in as to precisely which state functions fit 
into this category.  In ANR Pipeline Co. v. LaFaver, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that a state “has a special and fundamental interest in its tax 
collection system” that lies at the “core of state sovereignty.”177  Indeed, 
the court posited that a state would cease to exist without the power to 
tax.178  Therefore, the plaintiff-appellants could not bring suit against 
state officials in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of unequal 
taxation.179  The relief sought—recertification of the state’s tax 
assessments—would be “‘fully as intrusive’ into the state’s sovereignty 
as would be a retroactive money judgment against excessive property 
taxes.”180  Thus, tax collection has been deemed to fall into this limited 
category. 
 The Fourth Circuit took a more narrow approach to special 
sovereignty interests in Antrican v. Carmen.  In that case, particularly 
applicable in Reinhard, the court determined that a “‘state’s interest in 
administering a welfare program at least partially funded by the federal 
government is not such a core sovereign interest as to preclude the 
application of Ex Parte Young.’”181  Therefore, sovereign immunity did 
not bar claims by Medicaid recipients alleging failure by state officials to 
comply with the Medicaid Act.182  Judge Payne cited to Antrican for the 
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proposition that sovereign immunity did not bar VOPA’s claim because 
the state had no special state interest in the administration of the 
advocacy system.183  He averred that only functions that are “uniquely 
the state’s concern” such as fiscal matters may qualify as special 
sovereignty interests.184  Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiff was a 
state agency did not affect this determination.185  The issue and not the 
identity of the party counts.  The Court of Appeals, however, found that 
the “nature of the party making the claim” made all the difference 
because VOPA’s identity as a state agency “implicated the state’s 
interest in keeping its internal authority intact.”186  Thus, while control 
over a partially federally funded welfare program might not have 
constituted a core sovereign interest, freedom from interference in a legal 
battle between state agencies was.  The identity of the plaintiff as a state 
agency fundamentally changed the nature of the litigation. Virginia had a 
special sovereignty interest in settling its own internecine disputes 
without federal interference.  In sum, as shown above, the anti-
commandeering principles incorporated into the sovereign immunity 
doctrine and the special sovereignty interest in keeping state authority 
intact form the basis of Reinhard.  The next section considers whether 
the theory underlying Reinhard withstands scrutiny.  Moreover, it 
addresses what will be foremost in the minds of many—the practical 
consequences of Reinhard for administrative law. 
ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S EXTENSION OF THE ALDEN AND 
COEUR D’ALENE RATIONALES TO LIMIT EX PARTE YOUNG 
 The Reinhard decision clearly presents major implications for 
both the law of sovereign immunity and administrative law. By making 
application of Ex Parte Young depend in part on the identity of the party 
bringing suit, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals further narrowed a 
frequent exception to the sovereign immunity bar.  This may become the 
most recent trend in the continuing revival of the limitations inherent in 
federalism.  Moreover, Reinhard, for all intents and purposes, closes off 
a means for state administrative agencies charged with protecting federal 
rights to secure state compliance with federal law and to fulfill their 
statutory functions.  Private parties may still attempt to enforce federal 
statutory rights against recalcitrant state administrative agencies.  Such 
enforcement, however, raises the specter of standing problems in cases 
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like Reinhard where the agency arguably did not deprive the individual 
beneficiary of anything.  Moreover, for obvious reasons, the beneficiaries 
of such federal welfare programs may not have the resources or the 
wherewithal to bring suit against state agencies. Alden did acknowledge 
that the federal government could bring suit against the states to “‘take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”187  Therefore, the government 
can bring suit in parens patriae to vindicate the federal rights of such 
individuals.  The federal government, however, has limited resources 
which it will use sparingly and strategically and will not be able to 
vindicate the rights of every citizen in every case.188  Reinhard, thus 
raises the danger that federal regulatory schemes which require the 
participation and cooperation of the states will go unenforced.  Given 
these potential consequences, two questions become important: whether 
the Court of Appeals had a sound basis for its holding; and what the 
actual impact of its holding will be. 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Alden and Coeur d’Alene 
Principles 
 The Reinhard rationale appears somewhat amorphous and 
difficult to grasp.  The Court of Appeals appeared to exhibit a strong 
aversion to federal adjudication of an internal struggle among state 
agencies.  The reasons for this aversion, however, seem unclear from the 
opinion.  The Court of Appeals relied largely on the principles 
announced in Alden and stated that allowing the suits to go forward 
would raise political accountability problems.189  It becomes necessary, 
however, to delve beneath such surface rhetoric and determine the state 
sovereignty interests and principles of dual sovereignty that the Court of 
Appeals sought to protect.  In full view of these essential structural 
postulates, the Reinhard decision constitutes a sound, logical 
development in the emerging federalism jurisprudence. 
 Several potential criticisms of Reinhard deserve attention.  From 
one perspective, Reinhard appears to be a misapplication of the 
accountability rationale in Alden.  The Alden Court based its holding on 
the premise that allowing Congress to authorize suits for money damages 
in state courts pursuant to Article I would endanger political 
accountability by displacing elected state branches as the policy-
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makers.190  In so doing, Congress was essentially requiring the states to 
pay out money by circumventing the political process and opening up the 
courts to private claims. This is an example of creating federal rights and 
then requiring the states to do “the dirty work,” a practice denounced in 
the anti-commandeering cases.  Reinhard applied this same prohibition 
against interference in state internal processes to a struggle between state 
administrative agencies in federal court. 
 The stakes in Reinhard, however, were arguably somewhat 
different.  First, because VOPA was proceeding under Ex Parte Young 
and not congressional abrogation, it could not seek retrospective relief 
for money damages under the Edelman holding.191  Therefore, the 
allocation of scarce resources so central to the political process arguably 
was not implicated.  Moreover, Congress had not attempted to subject 
nonconsenting states to suit for this purpose.  Reinhard was not a 
situation in which Congress created a costly regulatory scheme and then 
opened up the state courts to private suits to force states to pay up and 
thus avoid the wrath of their constituents.  On the contrary, the federal 
government had provided funds to the states for the very purpose of 
enforcing the regulatory scheme.  Therefore, the states would not have 
had to pay out additional funds and bear the burden of explaining such 
expenditures to their citizens.  In addition, because the suit was brought 
in federal court and not state court, a state branch would not be forced 
into service against its own state counterpart.  From this perspective, 
therefore, Reinhard misapplied the political accountability principles 
underlying Alden. 
 These potential criticisms of Reinhard, however, ignore some of 
the more subtle considerations necessary in our system of dual 
federalism.  These considerations demonstrate that Reinhard rested on a 
sound basis.  The mere fact that money was not at stake in Reinhard does 
not end concerns as to accountability.  Actions for injunctive relief under 
Ex Parte Young may burden state budgets to a comparable degree as 
actions for money damages.192  Although requiring the state officials to 
turn over the records at issue in Reinhard may have been relatively 
inexpensive, other actions against state agencies under Ex Parte Young 
could result in injunctions to institute complex distribution or grievance 
procedures.  Complying with such procedures could require expenditure 
of additional funds from the state fisc, which would incur the wrath of 
state citizens.  Thus, accountability is not wholly absent in the Ex Parte 
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Young scenario confronted in Reinhard. Moreover, as the Court of 
Appeals suggested, the source of relief for state citizens in the wake of an 
unpopular decision by a federal court is unclear.  Presumably, the 
citizens would have to lobby Congress to repeal the relevant provisions.  
As the Court seemed to recognize in New York and Printz, however, 
many citizens may direct their dissatisfaction at the state representatives 
who tax them for compliance with the court’s mandate.  This potential 
for confusion of lines of federal and state accountability appeared to be a 
significant factor underlying the Reinhard decision. 
 While in this case, Congress did not attempt to subject 
nonconsenting states to suit in federal courts through abrogation, the 
reality is that it need not do so to expose states to suit.  At least one 
commentator has recognized that even if Congress does not abrogate, 
individuals can circumvent that bar and still enforce the relevant federal 
law through an Ex Parte Young action.193  If Ex Parte Young constitutes 
an available exception in the face of an ongoing violation of federal law 
even when Congress has not expressly abrogated, then the efficacy of the 
sovereign immunity bar appears subject to significant doubt.   The Court 
of Appeals, therefore, may have thought of Reinhard as closing a breach 
in the sovereign immunity wall, preventing the federal government from 
forcing the states to shoulder costly burdens by more subtle means than 
abrogation or waiver. Reinhard puts teeth into sovereign immunity.    
 In addition, the Court of Appeals may have silently been taking a 
play from Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision in Coeur d’Alene.  As 
discussed above, in that case, Justice Kennedy posited that interpretation 
and application of federal law governing state administrative agencies 
should be left to the states so that states can tailor the law to their own 
unique needs and interests.194  In this way, state judiciaries can weave 
pertinent federal law into their own states’ administrative law and 
mitigate the often constrictive “one-size-fits-all” nature of federal 
legislation.195  For this reason, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may 
have deemed it appropriate to divert such claims into state court where 
judges would be more in touch with state interests. 
 Some might argue that this reasoning disregards the compelling 
federal interests in the promotion of equality which prompt Congress to 
pass laws like the DDA and the PAIMIA in the first place.  An obvious 
riposte to this argument, however, is that if such federal interests are 
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sufficiently compelling to warrant vindication in a federal court, then 
Congress may accomplish that end by explicitly abrogating sovereign 
immunity in the statute or securing valid waiver.  Indeed, such a 
requirement would help ensure that only truly compelling federal 
interests jealously guarded and promoted by Congress according to its 
Fourteenth Amendment powers would overcome lesser state interests. 
 The prospect of diverting state administrative agencies’ federal 
causes of action into state courts raises another concern—whether state 
courts would even be obligated to adjudicate such cases. The fear arises 
as to whether state agencies could vindicate federal rights at all absent 
express abrogation or waiver due to state courts’ refusal to hear the cases 
and enforce federal law.  As discussed above, Testa v. Katt prohibits 
state courts from discriminating against federal causes of action absent a 
valid excuse.196  Alden held, however, that Congress lacks power under 
Article I to compel states to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought 
against them without their consent.197  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
implicitly recognized that Testa does not require state courts to 
adjudicate claims that would implicate the state’s sovereign immunity 
interests.198  The question thus arises whether a state court must 
adjudicate a federal claim brought by a state agency against another state 
agency since such a case arguably violates sovereign immunity.  The 
Fourth Circuit correctly recognized, however, that these fears prove 
illusory.  First, the Supreme Court has held that if a state statute waives 
sovereign immunity in comparable actions under state law, then it 
essentially discriminates against the federal cause of action in violation 
of Testa.199  The Court has emphasized that the Supremacy Clause 
prohibits state court refusal to enforce of federal law because of 
disagreement with its content.200  In Alden, the Court suggested that a 
state court may not “manipulate[] its immunity in systematic fashion to 
discriminate against federal causes of action.”201  Alden, therefore, did 
not simply eliminate the Testa holding whenever a federal cause of 
action implicates state sovereign immunity.  State courts may only refuse 
to hear federal questions on the basis of a neutral rule of judicial 
administration such as discouraging frivolous claims.202  Therefore, state 
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courts could not refuse to hear a federal claim by a state agency against 
another state agency out of mere disagreement with the content or 
policies embodied in the federal law.  Rather, if a state waives sovereign 
immunity for comparable state law claims, it must do the same for 
federal claims. 
 Furthermore, a suit by a state agency against another state 
agency in state court arguably does not implicate sovereign immunity 
because the special sovereign interest underlying Reinhard is not present.  
The Fourth Circuit found that federal adjudication of the claim 
“implicated the state’s interest in keeping its internal authority intact.”203  
In other words, only the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over an 
intramural dispute between state agencies constituted the violation of 
state sovereign immunity.  When a state court adjudicates such a claim, 
however, the state’s internal authority remains intact because the federal 
court does not referee the contest.  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s 
assurance that state courts remain open to such suits proves well-
founded.  Indeed, the both parties in Reinhard conceded that VOPA 
could have brought its claims in state court.204  The Court of Appeals 
explicitly confirmed that Testa would require state courts to hear such 
claims.205 
 As a final consideration, some might argue that the Fourth 
Circuit misperceived the conflict between VOPA and DMHMRAS, 
CVTC, and CHS.  Unlike other administrative agencies, VOPA’s 
primary function is to advocate for third parties—the recipients of mental 
health services.206  Therefore, the conflict in Reinhard arguably was not 
one between two state administrative agencies for power and resources.  
Rather, the conflict arguably was between state government caregivers—
DMHRAS, the CVTX, and CHS—and the mental health patients to 
whom they had a duty under federal law.  Under this conception, VOPA 
was serving as an advocate for the private patients’ interests and not for 
its own institutional interests.  Therefore, the internecine political 
struggle perceived by the Fourth Circuit was illusory, and the contest 
really boils down to one by private individuals against state agencies for 
ongoing violations of federal law.207  This conception fits neatly into the 
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Ex Parte Young paradigm and is far less intrusive of state sovereign 
immunity. 
 Such a fine and imperceptible line as whose interests are really at stake, 
however, would prove extremely difficult to apply in practice.  Many, if 
not most, administrative agencies advocate for or at least, act for the 
benefit of individual third parties.  Moreover, the efficacy with which an 
administrative agency serves the interests of third parties will often 
determine that agency’s share of resources and power.  Therefore, 
conflicts between state agencies cannot be neatly divided into those for 
scarce resources and those brought solely to vindicate the rights of third 
parties.  Such a test would prove exceedingly difficult to apply and 
would undermine the simplicity and predictability of the Reinhard rule.  
Although such a bright line rule may appear to frustrate Congress’ intent 
to protect third party rights, Congress is hardly without recourse. 
 As discussed further below, Congress may explicitly abrogate 
state sovereign immunity or secure valid waiver in exchange for federal 
resources.  In addition, the state courts remain available forums for state 
agencies to vindicate federal rights.   In sum, Reinhard is simply a 
natural extension of the prevailing sovereign immunity jurisprudence, 
aimed at maintaining political accountability, preserving the dignity of 
the states, and giving states the necessary leeway to adapt federal law to 
their unique needs.  The decision rests on the solid theoretical bases of 
ensuring political accountability and preserving the sovereign interests of 
the states.  Nevertheless, many doubtless find the potential consequences 
of Reinhard—inability to vindicate federal rights—exceedingly 
troublesome.   
B. The Consequences of the Reinhard Decision 
 As discussed above, the Court of Appeals was quick to point out 
that state administrative agencies could bring suit against the states 
provided Congress either abrogated sovereign immunity by unmistakable 
language or expressly conditioned receipt of federal resources on waiver 
of sovereign immunity.208  Thus, the court appeared almost to reassure 
VOPA and state agencies similarly situated that all was not lost.  As long 
as Congress includes unmistakable language to the effect that sovereign 
immunity does not apply, then the wall comes down and the federal 
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courts are open to suits by state agencies against the states.  The decision, 
therefore, to a significant extent simply punts the ball to Congress. In the 
waiver context, if Congress passes laws that offer the states federal funds 
to create particular administrative agencies or perform certain functions, 
it can easily incorporate language which makes acceptance of the federal 
gift or gratuity contingent on waiving immunity to suit.  Congress can 
extract such a waiver under any of its Article I powers.  Thus, federal 
courts will always be open to suits against states by state administrative 
agencies if Congress offers conditional funding in the enabling statute.  
At least one commentator has predicted that such conditional waiver will 
increase dramatically in the future precisely because of the narrowing of 
Ex Parte Young and the abrogation power.209  In addition, although the 
Supreme Court has determined that the abrogation power under Section 5 
is not unlimited, Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity by 
statute provided the statute is congruent and proportional to the goals of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.210  In Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, for instance the Court upheld Congressional 
abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act.211 Reinhard does little more than place the ball firmly in Congress’ 
court. 
 In addition, as discussed above, even absent congressional 
abrogation or waiver, state agencies are not left without recourse for the 
enforcement of federal rights.  Rather, under Testa, the Supremacy 
Clause compels state courts to adjudicate federal questions and enforce 
federal rights. Sovereign immunity does not afford state courts a valid 
excuse to refuse jurisdiction because under Reinhard, only federal 
adjudication of a conflict between state agencies violates sovereign 
immunity.  As Justice Kennedy averred in Coeur d’Alene and the Fourth 
Circuit confirmed in Reinhard, state courts are perfectly competent to 
adjudicate such federal questions. In addition, the states have an interest 
in interpreting and applying federal law when it relates to state 
administrative law.  In such a context, states may effectively resolve 
conflicts between federal laws and their own, and interpret and apply 
federal law so as not to frustrate the unique policy goals of the state.  In 
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sum, the actual impact on state administrative agencies’ enforcement of 
federal regulatory schemes likely will be minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
 Reinhard marks a legal crossroads on a number of levels.  On 
one level it is the crossroads between Ex Parte Young and the anti-
commandeering principles incorporated into the Supreme Court’s 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence in Alden.  On another level, it 
represents the cross-roads between the law of sovereign immunity and 
administrative law.  Reinhard narrows the means by which state 
administrative agencies may secure state compliance with the federal 
scheme which they discharge.  State agencies must resort to other 
avenues to secure such compliance.  Ultimately, however, it will be up to 
Congress to take responsibility for such enforcement and either abrogate 
or secure state consent to suit. 
